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Abstract
This paper examines the importance of the theory of intellectual cognition in the development of early
modern philosophy. It compares three conceptions of the intellect, held respectively by some scholastic
Aristotelians, Descartes, and Locke. Examination of these three cases provides an opportunity to locate early
modern discussions of the cognitive faculties in relation to recent understandings of psychology,
epistemology, logic, mind, and their relations. The early modern discussions are not easily fit into the modern
categories of epistemology and psychology. Reflection on this fact may help us to delimit more precisely and
to see some problems in recent concepts of naturalism in relation to philosophy and psychology.
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               The narrative structures within which we describe the origin and
          development of early modern philosophy at the same time reveal something about
          what we find interesting and valuable in that philosophy.  In recent decades,
          the older trend of characterizing early modern philosophy as a triumphant "Age
          of Reason" has given way to the organizing theme of a skeptical crisis and the
          responses to it.  According to the earlier story, in the seventeenth century
          Reason cast off the yoke of Church authority and Aristotelian orthodoxy;
          newly-freed thinkers revitalized philosophy, created the "new science," and
          pushed on toward Enlightenment.1  Now, however, it is more popular to speak of
          a skeptical crisis in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which set the
          philosophical task of "refuting the skeptic" for subsequent generations.
          _________________________
          *To appear in _L_o_g_i_c _a_n_d _t_h_e _W_o_r_k_i_n_g_s _o_f _t_h_e _M_i_n_d: _T_h_e _L_o_g_i_c _o_f _I_d_e_a_s _a_n_d
          _F_a_c_u_l_t_y _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y _i_n _E_a_r_l_y _M_o_d_e_r_n _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, Patricia Easton, ed. (North
          American Kant Society, in press).  An earlier version was given at a
          conference on "Logic and the Workings of the Mind: Ramus to Kant" at the
          University of Western Ontario, May, 1995.  Thanks to Lanier Anderson, Alan
          Kors, Holly Pittman, and Alison Simmons for their comments on subsequent
          drafts.
          1.  The emphasis on the free use of reason arose early: Johann Jakob Brucker,
          _H_i_s_t_o_r_i_a _c_r_i_t_i_c_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e, 4 vols. (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1742-44), vol. IV.
          It structured Friederich Ueberweg, _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, _f_r_o_m _T_h_a_l_e_s _t_o _t_h_e
          _P_r_e_s_e_n_t _T_i_m_e, George S. Morris, trans., 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
          1880), vol. II, though he incorporated the skeptical theme, as well, dividing
          early modern philosophy into three periods described as (1) "transition to
          independent investigation," (2) "empiricism, dogmatism, and skepticism," and
          (3) "criticism and speculation."  It is reflected in Ernst Cassirer,
          _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _t_h_e _E_n_l_i_g_h_t_e_n_m_e_n_t, Fritz C. A. Koeln and James P. Pettegrove,
          trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), ch. 1, sec. 1, and Peter
          A. Schouls, _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s _a_n_d _t_h_e _E_n_l_i_g_h_t_e_n_m_e_n_t (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-
          Queens University Press, 1989).  Alfred North Whitehead, _S_c_i_e_n_c_e _a_n_d _t_h_e
          _M_o_d_e_r_n _W_o_r_l_d (New York:  Macmillan, 1925), does not follow the theme of
          throwing off authority, but he characterizes the seventeenth century as a
          "Century of Genius" that yields eighteenth-century Enlightenment (chs. 3, 4).
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          Lacking a compelling response to skepticism, philosophers were forced to
          retreat, and they proposed ever narrower "limits to knowledge" until Kant took
          a last stand on the redoubt of transcendental idealism.2  Both descriptive
          stories portray "epistemology" or theory of knowledge--often allied with a
          concern for method--as the defining preoccupation of early modern philosophers
          from Descartes through Kant.  In describing this "epistemological turn," story
          tellers from Thomas Reid through Richard Rorty have given pride of place to
          the "theory of ideas,"3 though others have properly recognized the role of
          metaphysical concepts, including the concepts of "substance" and of "necessary
          connections" between properties or events.4
               There can be no doubt that these elements--anti-Aristotelianism,
          _________________________
          2.  Richard H. Popkin, _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _S_c_e_p_t_i_c_i_s_m _f_r_o_m _E_r_a_s_m_u_s _t_o _S_p_i_n_o_z_a
          (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979), has
          made the skeptical theme prominent in recent years; Ueberweg’s second period
          of modern philosophy ranked skepticism together with empiricism and
          dogmatism as "rival systems" to which "criticism" was a response (_H_i_s_t_o_r_y,
          vol. II); Immanuel Kant, _C_r_i_t_i_q_u_e _o_f _P_u_r_e _R_e_a_s_o_n, Norman Kemp Smith, trans.
          (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965), proposed a similar tripartite division
          (A761/B789), among other analyses of philosophy’s history (A852-56/B880-84);
          "A" and "B" refer to the pagination of the first and second editions,
          respectively, of Kant’s _K_r_i_t_i_k _d_e_r _r_e_i_n_e_n _V_e_r_n_u_n_f_t (Riga: Hartnoch, 1781,
          1787), hereafter cited as "CPR" plus page numbers.  E. M. Curley, _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s
          _a_g_a_i_n_s_t _t_h_e _S_k_e_p_t_i_c_s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978),
          endorses a portion of this picture by maintaining that Descartes’s mature
          philosophy was directly motivated by the threat of pyrrhonian skepticism (p.
          38).
          3.  Thomas Reid, _I_n_q_u_i_r_y _i_n_t_o _t_h_e _H_u_m_a_n _M_i_n_d, ch. 1, secs. 3-7, in his
          _W_o_r_k_s, William Hamilton, ed., 2 vols. (Edinburgh: James Thin, 1895), vol. I,
          pp. 99-103 (Reid of course did not use the term "epistemology," and his
          remarks on the theory of ideas were part of an analysis of knowledge of the
          human mind itself, and its cognitive capacities); Richard Rorty, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y
          _a_n_d _t_h_e _M_i_r_r_o_r _o_f _N_a_t_u_r_e (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), who
          cites Reid, among others.  The historiography of an epistemological turn,
          with central emphasis on the theory of ideas, is found in recent general
          histories of philosophy, e. g., Roger Scruton, _F_r_o_m _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s _t_o
          _W_i_t_t_g_e_n_s_t_e_i_n: _A _S_h_o_r_t _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _M_o_d_e_r_n _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y (New York: Harper
          Colophon, 1982), John Cottingham, _T_h_e _R_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s_t_s (Oxford: Oxford
          University Press, 1988), pp. 4-11; R. S. Woolhouse, _T_h_e _E_m_p_i_r_i_c_i_s_t_s (Oxford:
          Oxford University Press, 1988), ch. 1.
          4.  Louis E. Loeb, _F_r_o_m _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s _t_o _H_u_m_e: _C_o_n_t_i_n_e_n_t_a_l _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_s _a_n_d _t_h_e
          _D_e_v_e_l_o_p_m_e_n_t _o_f _M_o_d_e_r_n _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
                                              - 3 -
          skepticism, method, knowledge, substance, and necessity--must all be found in
          any account of early modern "metaphysics and epistemology," as we often but
          anachronistically label the theoretical (as opposed to practical) philosophy
          of the seventeenth century.  I wish to show that they can be combined into yet
          a third narrative, one that begins by taking seriously seventeenth-century
          conceptions of the topics and methods central to the rise of a "new"
          philosophy.  In this revisionist story, differing approaches to the central
          subject matter of early modern metaphysics--knowledge of substances through
          their essences and causal powers--arise as a result of disagreements about the
          powers of the human cognitive faculties.5  Methodological writings are seen as
          attempts to direct readers in the proper use of their cognitive faculties.
          The early modern rejection of the Aristotelian theory of cognition ranks
          equally in importance with rejection of Aristotelian doctrines about nature.
          Skepticism is more often than not a tool to be used in teaching the reader the
          proper use of the cognitive faculties, or indeed in convincing the reader of
          the existence or inexistence of certain cognitive faculties or powers.
          Instead of early modern "epistemology" or "theory of knowledge," one speaks,
          along with seventeenth century writers, of theories of the cognitive faculties
          or knowing power.  The early modern rejection of Aristotelian logic can then
          be seen as reflecting a negative assessment of the fit between the syllogism
          and logic considered as an art of reasoning that refines the use of the
          cognitive faculties.  References to "reason" and "the senses," which, in the
          _________________________
          5.  I have sketched this story-line for the history of modern philosophy in
          my _T_h_e _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _t_h_e _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e: _T_h_e_o_r_i_e_s _o_f _S_p_a_t_i_a_l _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_i_o_n _f_r_o_m _K_a_n_t
          _t_o _H_e_l_m_h_o_l_t_z (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), chs. 2, 6.  John W.
          Yolton, _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_u_a_l _A_c_q_u_a_i_n_t_a_n_c_e _f_r_o_m _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s _t_o _R_e_i_d (Minneapolis:
          University of Minnesota Press), appreciates the significance of the
          faculties in early modern philosophy, but assimilates concern with the
          faculties directly to a present-day conception of "psychology" (pp. 16, 39,
          105).
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          traditional historiography, are typically understood as shorthand for "a
          priori propositions" and "empirical evidence," can now be seen as references
          to cognitive faculties.
               When described in its own terms, the development of philosophy from
          Descartes to Kant may be seen as a series of claims about the power of the
          intellect to know the essences of things, with resulting consequences for
          ontology and for the role of sensory cognition in natural philosophy.  Thus,
          Descartes employed skepticism as an artifice in order to bring his readers to
          an awareness that (as he claimed) the faculty of the intellect, contrary to
          Aristotelian doctrine, can be exercised independently of sensory images and
          their content.  Having revealed the power of the intellect to operate
          independently of the senses in grasping the "cogito" reasoning, he next
          exercises this power in contemplating God--without, of course, the aid of
          sensory content--and then in discerning the foundations for a new natural
          philosophy; only subsequently do the senses play an essential role in the
          investigation of nature.  Spinoza and Leibniz each looked to pure intellect to
          achieve his own revised metaphysical picture.  When Locke tried to follow, he
          became convinced that the power of the intellect or understanding is more
          restricted than either the Aristotelians or Descartes had claimed: in
          particular, he found that the understanding cannot discover real essences
          within sensory experience, and that it can achieve no content independently of
          sensory experience (or reflection thereupon), either.  Berkeley mounted a
          direct attack on the use of the intellect to know matter, denying the very
          intelligibility of material substance as understood in Cartesian metaphysics,
          but he affirmed the power of the intellect to know spiritual or immaterial
          substances.  Hume continued Locke’s inquiry into limits on the powers of the
          human understanding, arriving at the conclusion that it is unable to know the
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          substances and causal powers of traditional metaphysics.  Hume held that the
          operation of the understanding is limited to two separate domains: reasoning
          about relations of ideas, where intuitive and demonstrative knowledge can be
          obtained, but without thereby achieving any knowledge of facts, or reasoning
          about facts known through the senses, which provides no rational insight into
          the substances and causal connections of traditional metaphysics, with the
          consequence that the understanding is here limited to charting successions of
          sensory perceptions.  Kant entered his critical period when he realized that
          human cognizers do not have available the "real use" of the intellect or
          understanding to know an intelligible world of substances; at the center of
          his critical (theoretical) philosophy was his new theory of the human
          understanding as a faculty limited to synthesizing the materials of sensory
          representation but unable to penetrate to things in themselves, with the
          consequence that knowledge of necessary connections could be attained only
          within the bounds of transcendental idealism.6
               It is not my intention to put forward this revised narrative as a single
          master story for early modern philosophy.  Indeed, beyond the three narrative
          themes sketched so far, others might be suggested in which differing subsets
          of philosophers would play greater or lesser roles; these include the story of
          the changing relations among metaphysics, theology, religion, and science
          (here Malebranche would enter prominently), and the relation of metaphysics
          and theory of mind to moral and political philosophy.  My aim is to illustrate
          the force of one particular revised narrative by using it in a comparison of
          three conceptions of the intellect, conceptions respectively held by some
          scholastic Aristotelians, Descartes, and Locke.  These three examples are not
          _________________________
          6.  Support for various descriptive claims made here may be found in my
          _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e, chs. 2-3.
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          intended to yield an exhaustive taxonomy of early modern theories of the
          intellect, nor have they been chosen for what they might contribute directly
          to a present-day theory of the intellect.  Rather, discussion of these
          conceptions will demonstrate the central role played by the theory of the
          intellect (and other cognitive faculties) in three prominent theoretical
          philosophies of the early modern period, and it will clarify the point of some
          early modern disputes.  It will also offer an opportunity to locate early
          modern discussions of the cognitive faculties with respect to recent
          understandings of psychology, epistemology, logic, mind, and their relations.
          The early modern discussions are not easily fit into the modern categories of
          epistemology and psychology.  Reflection on this fact may help us see some
          problems in recent conceptions of naturalism as applied to philosophy and
          psychology.  In this way, contextually sensitive historical reflection
          contributes directly to contemporary understanding.
          1.  Three Conceptions of Intellect
               Theories or conceptions of the intellect are indicators or even
          determiners of the scope and limits ascribed to theoretical philosophy by
          their holders.  If one thinks that the intellect has access to eternal Forms
          or that it can discern the essences of things, one might well have great hopes
          for the discipline of metaphysics and related theoretical pursuits in natural
          philosophy.  Conversely, if one holds that the power of the intellect is
          limited, that essences are hidden and unknowable, then one will, by
          traditional standards, have a modest conception of what can be done in
          metaphysics and natural philosophy, though one might also be led to revise the
          aims of those disciplines or to propose a new vision of the proper content of
          natural philosophy, as did Locke, Hume, and Kant.
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               As the early modern period began, Aristotle’s theory of intellect was
          predominant.  His _D_e _a_n_i_m_a analyzed the powers of psyche or soul, understood
          as an animating principle possessed of vegetative, sensitive, and (in humans)
          rational powers.  It devoted greatest attention to the cognitive powers of the
          soul, especially the senses and intellect.  Aristotle’s doctrine of the
          intellect had taken on a particular fascination for late antique and Arabic
          commentators, and parts of Book III, chs. 4-5--especially where he said that
          there is an element of thought that is capable of "making all things" and
          another capable of "becoming all things"7--were extensively elaborated.
          Interpreters dubbed the first power the "active intellect" and the second the
          "patient" or "passive" intellect.  They offered diverse theories of the
          natures of these intellectual powers, including the theory that there is one
          active intellect for all human beings.  Although the latter position did have
          some adherents in the Latin West, the orthodox view attributed individual
          active and patient intellects to individual human beings.8  As a background to
          _________________________
          7.  Aristotle, _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, in his _C_o_m_p_l_e_t_e _W_o_r_k_s, Jonathan Barnes, ed., 2
          vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. I, 430a14-15.
          8.  Giacomo Zabarella, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_i _i_n _I_I_I. _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a
          (Frankfurt am Main: Zetner, 1606), "Liber de mente agente," ch. 13 (cols.
          935-7), held that God performs the function of the active intellect for all
          humans.  The orthodox view was held by Thomas Aquinas, _S_u_m_m_a _t_h_e_o_l_o_g_i_a_e
          (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1964-81), I.76.2; 79.4-5, hereafter "ST"; Aquinas,
          _Q_u_e_s_t_i_o_n_s _o_n _t_h_e _S_o_u_l, J. H. Robb, trans. (Milwaukee: Marquette University
          Press, 1984), qus. 3-5; John Duns Scotus, _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, qu. 13, in  his _O_p_e_r_a
          _o_m_n_i_a, L. Wadding, ed., 26 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1891-95), vol. III, p. 546;
          Francisco Toledo, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_a _u_n_a _c_u_m _q_u_a_e_s_t_i_o_n_i_b_u_s _i_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s
          _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a (K"oln: Birckmann, 1594), II.1, qu. 2 (fol. 40vb-48vb);
          Francisco Su’arez, _D_e _a_n_i_m_a (hereafter, "DA"), IV.8.4-8, in his _O_p_e_r_a _o_m_n_i_a,
          M. Andre, ed., 26 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1856-78), vol. III, pp. 741a-43b;
          Coimbra College, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_i _i_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a (K"oln: Zetner, n.d.,
          ca. 1600), III.5, qu. 1, art. 1-2 (pp. 369-374); Antonio Rubio, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_i
          _i_n _l_i_b_r_o_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _S_t_a_g_y_r_i_t_a_e _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_o_r_u_m _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_s, _D_e _a_n_i_m_a (Lyon:
          Joannes Pillehotte, 1620), "Tractatus de natura, et ratione atque officio
          intellectus agens," qu. 4 (pp. 652-53); works entitled "commentaries" on _D_e
          _a_n_i_m_a will subsequently be referred to as "CDA."  On Avicenna, Averroes, and
          the late Greek and Arabic background to the view that human intellection
          depends upon a single active intellect, see Herbert A. Davidson, _A_l_f_a_r_a_b_i,
          _A_v_i_c_e_n_n_a, _a_n_d _A_v_e_r_r_o_e_s, _o_n _I_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t (New York, Oxford: Oxford University
          Press, 1992).
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          early modern philosophy, my interest here is in late scholastic Aristotelian
          theories of cognition, rather than in the interpretation of Aristotle _p_e_r _s_e.
               Much of the _De anima_ is organized as a theory of cognitive faculties.
          Late scholastic Aristotelian theories (following Aristotle) strictly separated
          the sensitive and intellectual powers of the soul.  According to such
          theories, the sensory power always relies on corporeal organs, but the
          intellect (it was usually held) does not, it being an immaterial power of the
          form of the human body.  The primary function of the Aristotelian intellect is
          to abstract essences or common natures from the images received by the senses.
          In accordance with the dictum that "there is nothing in the intellect that was
          not first in the senses," this act of abstraction depends on sensory images or
          "phantasms" for its operation.  Central interpreters of Aristotle--from Thomas
          Aquinas to such late scholastics as Su’arez, the Coimbra Commentators, Rubio,
          and the textbook author Eustace of St. Paul--all held that there is "no
          thought without an image," that is, that each act of intellection requires a
          material image drawn from the senses and actually present in the imagination
          or "phantasia."9  Aristotelian theories of cognition describe a chain of
          events starting from external objects and ultimately resulting in the
          reception of an "intelligible species" in the patient intellect.  External
          objects produce "intentional species" in the medium between them and the
          cognizer; an oak tree thus produces species of brown bark and green leaves.
          These species are received by the senses and conveyed to the imagination.
          Then the intellect, perhaps operating over several species received across
          _________________________
          9.  Aquinas, ST I.84.6-7, I.87.1; Su’arez, DA IV.7.3 (p. 739); Coimbra
          College, CDA III.5, qu. 3, art. 2, (pp. 383-4), III.8, qu. 8, art. 2 (pp.
          453-5); Rubio, CDA, "Tractatus de intellectu agente," qu. 2-3 (pp. 637-46),
          "Tractatus de natura, actu et obiecto intellectus possibilis," qu. 7 (pp.
          692-3); and Eustace of St. Paul, _S_u_m_m_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _q_u_a_d_r_i_p_a_r_t_i_t_a, 4 parts
          (K"oln: Philip Albert, 1638), pt. III, "Physica" (hereafter, "SP-P"), III.4,
          disp. 2, qus. 4-5, 7, 10 (pp. 287-9, 290-3, 298).
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          time, abstracts the essence or common nature of the oak tree.  Systematic
          knowledge, or _s_c_i_e_n_t_i_a, is of the common nature or the universal, not of the
          particular.10
               Beyond this general description, a further and misleading tenet is often
          ascribed to late scholastic Aristotelian theories of cognition: viz., that the
          process by which the common nature is "abstracted" amounts to an "absorption"
          of the species from the senses and imagination into the intellect.  On this
          interpretation, it is as if, as the term "abstraction" itself might suggest,
          the intellect simply received the "form" in the species separated from all
          material conditions.11  Intellection would simply be a kind of
          dematerialization, or an extraction of a form from the still-material
          representations of the senses and its transferral to the patient intellect as
          an intelligible species (a conception that is indeed suggested by the common
          turn of phrase that the active intellect "illuminates" the phantasm).  There
          would be no need to explain how intelligible species are "created" by the
          active intellect; the latter’s agency would simply be that of preparing the
          form in the material phantasm for transfer to the patient intellect.
          _________________________
          10.  For a survey of late Aristotelian theories of sensory and intellectual
          cognition, see my "Cognitive Faculties," in the _C_a_m_b_r_i_d_g_e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f
          _S_e_v_e_n_t_e_e_n_t_h _C_e_n_t_u_r_y _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, Michael Ayers and Daniel Garber, eds.
          (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press).  Leen Spruit, _S_p_e_c_i_e_s
          _I_n_t_e_l_l_i_g_i_b_i_l_i_s: _F_r_o_m _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_i_o_n _t_o _K_n_o_w_l_e_d_g_e, 2 vols. (Leiden, New York: E.
          J. Brill, 1994-95), vol. II, has just published a detailed study of
          intellectual cognition in later scholasticism.
          11.  Yolton, _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_u_a_l _A_c_q_u_a_i_n_t_a_n_c_e, pp. 6-10, where "absorption" is used
          to characterize some scholastic accounts of sensory perception, but also
          fits his account of intellectual abstraction and the production of
          intelligible species.  Also D. W. Hamlyn, _S_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n _a_n_d _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_i_o_n: _A
          _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _t_h_e _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_i_o_n (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
          1961), p. 48; Brian E. O’Neil, _E_p_i_s_t_e_m_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l _D_i_r_e_c_t _R_e_a_l_i_s_m _i_n _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s’_s
          _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), pp. 48-49.
          But others have avoided this reading, at least of Aquinas’s position:
          Sheldon M. Cohen, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of
          Sensible Forms," _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _R_e_v_i_e_w 91 (1982), pp. 193-209, on p. 199;
          Paul Hoffman, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,"
          _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _R_e_v_i_e_w 99 (1990), pp. 73-82, on p.75n8.
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               None of the interpreters of Aristotle cited above held that the intellect
          absorbs a form from the imagination or phantasia.  Consonant with the
          principle that a "lower being" such as matter cannot act on a "higher being"
          such as the immaterial intellect,12 these authors all affirmed that
          intelligible species are produced in the patient intellect by the causal power
          of the active intellect, which can "make all things"; the material phantasm
          serves as a "material," "instrumental," or "partial" causal factor.
          "Abstraction," therefore, should not be equated with "extraction."  Aquinas
          put the point as follows:
               Phantasms, since they are likenesses of individuals, and exist in
               corporeal organs, do not have the same mode of existence as does the
               human intellect (as is obvious from what has been said), and
               therefore are not able to make an impression on the patient
               intellect by their own power.  This is done by the power of the
               active intellect, which, by turning toward the phantasms, produces
               in the patient intellect a certain likeness that represents, as
               regards specific nature only, that of which the phantasms are
               phantasms.  And it is in this way that the intelligible species is
               said to be abstracted from the phantasms; not as though a form,
               numerically the same as the one that existed before in the
               phantasms, should subsequently come to be in the patient intellect,
          _________________________
          12.  Aquinas cites this principle, attributing it to Aristotle himself:
          "Aristotle held that the intellect does have an operation in which the body
          does not communicate.  Now, nothing corporeal can make an impression on an
          incorporeal thing.  And therefore in order to cause an intellectual
          operation, according to Aristotle, the mere impression caused by sensible
          bodies does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for _t_h_e
          _a_c_t_i_v_e _i_s _s_u_p_e_r_i_o_r _t_o _t_h_e _p_a_s_s_i_v_e, as he says himself" (ST I.84.6; my
          revisions to the translation); the other authors cited in n. 9 also held
          this principle.  Davidson, _A_l_f_a_r_a_b_i, _A_v_i_c_e_n_n_a, _a_n_d _A_v_e_r_r_o_e_s, _o_n _I_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t,
          discusses this and related principles in late Greek and Arabic commentators.
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               in the way a body is taken up from one place and transferred to
               another.13
          The position that the corporeal phantasm, being material, cannot of itself be
          received into or affect the immaterial intellect was accepted by each of the
          other authors.14  More generally, these authors saw the active intellect’s
          ability to "make all things" as playing an important explanatory role: it
          explains how the intellect can abstract common natures from imperfect sensory
          images.  Without adopting a doctrine of innate ideas, and while affirming that
          the patient intellect is a _t_a_b_u_l_a _r_a_s_a, these authors could hold that the
          active intellect brings something to the creation of intelligible species.15
          As Aquinas put it, the light of the human intellect is a "participating
          likeness" of the "uncreated" (divine) light that contains the eternal
          _________________________
          13.  Aquinas, ST I.85.1, ad 3, in which the final quoted sentence reads: "Et
          per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus; non
          quod aliqua eadem numero forma quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum
          fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco, et
          transfertur ad alterum."  (Translation altered from Blackfriars; see also
          Aquinas, _S_u_m_m_a _T_h_e_o_l_o_g_i_c_a, English Dominicans, trans., 19 vols., London:
          Thomas Baker/Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1911-22.)
          14.  While agreeing that a species conjoined with matter--even if conjoined
          non-standardly, being a "form without matter"--cannot by itself affect the
          immaterial intellect, these authors characterized the causal role of
          corporeal phantasms in the production of intelligible species differently:
          Su’arez maintained that the phantasm does not affect the possible intellect
          by "influx," but "materially" or by "exemplar," mediated by the fact that
          imagination and intellect are powers of the same soul (_D_e _a_n_i_m_a, IV.2.10-12,
          vol. III, p. 719a-b); the Coimbran text discussed ways in which the active
          intellect might be taken as both a "partial" and an "instrumental" cause,
          and said that the phantasm "cooperates" to "excite" the active intellect to
          produce the species (CDA III.5, qu. 6, pp. 407-9); Rubio designated the
          phantasm an "instrumental" cause ("elevated" by another power) and the
          active intellect the "principal" or "primary" cause of the production of an
          immaterial intellectual species in the patient intellect (CDA III.4-5,
          "Tractatus de intellectu agente," qu. 3, pp. 646-52); Eustace described the
          phantasm as a "material" or "dispositive" as opposed to "efficient" cause
          (SP-P III.4, disp. 2, qu. 7, pp. 292-3).
          15.  Thomas Aquinas, ST I.79.2; 84.3-5; Su’arez, DA IV.2.7-18; 7.3; 8.7-8;
          Coimbra College, CDA III.4-5, qu. 1, art. 2, "nuda tabula" (pp. 372, 374);
          Rubio, CDA III.4-5, "Tractatus de intellectu agente," qus. 1-3; Eustace of
          St. Paul, SP-P III.4, disp. 2, qu. 7, "tabula rasa" (p. 291); the active
          intellect "makes" (_f_a_b_r_i_c_a_r_e) intelligible species (pp. 291-2).
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          types.
16
  Far from simply absorbing its content from "phantasms," the
          intellect has a dispositional capacity to create intelligible species that
          reflect the eternal types; but (so they argued, appealing to introspection,
          among other considerations), it cannot do so without the presence of an
          appropriate phantasm.
               The essential role assigned to corporeal phantasms in the operation of
          the intellect placed limits on the cognition of immaterial entities such as
          God and the soul.  There are no sensible species, and hence no phantasms, of
          such entities.  Consequently, those who accepted this account of the intellect
          held that in this life human beings can at best achieve a confused
          intellectual cognition of God or the soul, by reasoning from creation to
          creator or from the soul’s bodily operations to its nature and powers.
          Francisco Toledo, whom Descartes would later remember from his school days,
          contended that an embodied intellect "cannot naturally possess clear and
          distinct cognition of immaterial substance"; Aquinas, the Coimbrans, Rubio,
          and Eustace said similar things.17  Authors in this tradition developed
          elaborate analyses of how God and the immaterial soul can be known, given that
          _________________________
          16.  Thomas Aquinas, ST I.84.5: "Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana
          omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia
          cognoscimus.  Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil est
          aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo
          continentur rationes aeternae"; he explicitly distinguishes this position
          from Platonism and other positions in which the eternal types are beheld by
          the human intellect independently of the senses, or are known innately.  See
          also ST I.79.3-4; Aquinas, _Q_u_e_s_t_i_o_n_s _o_n _t_h_e _S_o_u_l, qu. 5, resp. and _a_d 6;
          Aquinas, _T_r_u_t_h, R. W. Mulligan, trans., 3 vols. (Chicago: Regnery, 1952-54),
          qu. 10, art. 6.
          17.  Toledo, CDA III.7, qu. 23, concl. 3: "Intellectus in corpore non potest
          habere naturaliter claram & distinctam cognitionem substantiae immaterialis"
          (fol. 168ra); also, concl. 4: "Substantiae immateriales a nobis confusem in
          hoc statu cognoscuntur" (fol. 168rb).  Aquinas, ST I.87.3; I.88; Coimbra
          College, CDA III.5, qu. 5, art. 2 (pp. 402-3); III.8, qu. 7, art. 2 (p.
          449); qu. 8, art. 2 (pp. 453-55); Rubio, CDA III.4-5, "Tractatus de
          intellectu possibili," qus. 5-6 (pp. 680-89); and Eustace of St. Paul, SP-P
          III.4, disp. 2, qus. 4-5, 7 (pp. 287-89, 290-93).
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          their theory of intellection precluded clear and evident cognition of them.
          The doctrine of analogy is one instance of such analysis.
               According to a prominent form of Aristotelianism, then, systematic
          knowledge or _s_c_i_e_n_t_i_a is of universals or common natures, cognized by means of
          intelligible species which themselves can be formed only with the aid of
          sensory images.  The ability of the intellect to form representations of the
          essences of things cannot be explained by its simply "taking up" the content
          provided by the senses, or even by its sifting through and comparing sensory
          images.  The intellect is an immaterial power that cannot be affected by the
          inherently corporeal activity of the senses, but which is able to make
          intelligible species with the cooperation of sensory images.  This ability was
          taken to reflect a similarity between the human active intellect and the
          divine intellect, containing the eternal types.  The things best known by the
          human intellect are the substantial forms or common natures of corporeal
          things.  Immaterial entities are cognized only confusedly in this life.
               Descartes, who was well-schooled in this tradition, turned nearly every
          tenet of this theory of cognition on its head.  In particular, he held that
          the intellect can operate independently of the senses and imagination, and
          that in so doing it can achieve "clear and distinct" cognition of God, the
          soul, and matter.  Whereas sense and intellect were markedly distinct
          faculties for the Aristotelians, with the intellect depending on sense, for
          Descartes intellect was the only essential cognitive faculty, sense and
          imagination being "modes" of intellection, arising from mind-body union.18
          _________________________
          18.  Descartes, _M_e_d_i_t_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_n _F_i_r_s_t _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, in _T_h_e _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l
          _W_r_i_t_i_n_g_s _o_f _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald
          Murdoch, trans., 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984-85),
          II:51, 54; _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_s _o_f _F_i_r_s_t _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, pt. 1, art. 32 (I:204), where
          Descartes lists pure understanding (or pure intellection), imagination, and
          sense percepton as modes of "perception" or of the "operation of the
          intellect"; hereafter, vols. I and II of the Cottingham _e_t _a_l. translation
          is abbreviated "CSM" (plus volume and page number).
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          Intellect can operate independently of the senses--when it is known as "pure
          intellect"--but sense perception (in humans) is an operation of the intellect
          (broadly construed).
               Thus, beyond his notorious rejection of Aristotelian physics, Descartes
          also rejected the Aristotelian theory of cognition, including especially the
          view that intellectual cognition requires sensory images.  I believe that this
          rejection was first consolidated in 1629 or 1630, simultaneous with
          Descartes’s discovery of his mature metaphysics.19  His new theory of
          cognition became an essential bridge to his metaphysics, in that he appealed
          to the deliverances of the intellect, given independently of the senses, to
          convince his readers of important new metaphysical doctrines, including his
          assertion that the essence of matter is extension.20  Descartes’s concern with
          method, which has often been linked to "epistemology," in fact reflects his
          efforts to train his audience in the proper use of their cognitive faculties.
               Descartes crafted the primary statement of his metaphysics, in the
          _M_e_d_i_t_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_n _F_i_r_s_t _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, as a tool for bringing his readers to a
          discovery that the pure intellect is a faculty best exercised independently of
          _________________________
          19.  In 1630 Descartes wrote to Mersenne that he had worked on metaphysics
          intensely during his first nine months in the Netherlands (a period ending
          in 1629): to Mersenne, 16 April 1630, in his _O_e_u_v_r_e_s, Charles Adam and Paul
          Tannery, eds., rev. ed., 11 vols. (Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964-1976), vol. I, p.
          144 (hereafter, the _O_e_u_v_r_e_s are referred to as "AT," followed by volume and
          page numbers); translation in _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _W_r_i_t_i_n_g_s _o_f _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s, vol. III,
          John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, trans.
          (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 22; hereafter, vol. III is
          abbreviated "CSMK."  In 1637 he reported that "eight years ago" he had
          written "in Latin the beginnings of a treatise of metaphysics," in which,
          among other things, he argued for a soul-body distinction (to Mersenne, 27
          February 1637, AT I:350; CSMK, p. 53).  On Descartes’s "metaphysical turn,"
          see my "Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes," in _E_s_s_a_y_s _o_n _t_h_e _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y
          _a_n_d _S_c_i_e_n_c_e _o_f _R_e_n’_e _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s, Stephen Voss, ed. (New York: Oxford
          University Press, 1993), pp. 259-287, and the literature cited therein.
          20.  Descartes asserts that matter’s essence is extension in the opening
          paragraphs of the Fifth Meditation; he draws a clear distinction between
          intellectual and imaginal cognition of extension at the start of the Sixth
          Meditation. (CSM II:44, 50-51, AT VII:63, 72-3)
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          sensory content.  In adopting the meditational structure, Descartes chose to
          pattern his work after devotional literature or spiritual exercises, a
          literary genre that paradigmatically employed a theory of the faculties to
          order the meditator’s search for God.21  In Descartes’s hands, the structure
          of this devotional genre was turned toward a cognitive end: that of attaining
          knowledge of first principles through proper use of the intellect.22  In order
          to reach the cognitive states toward which Descartes was leading them,
          Aristotelians such as those canvassed earlier would have needed to be
          convinced that there can be thought without a phantasm, or at least they would
          have needed to be induced to have such thoughts.  To this end, Descartes
          begins his meditations with a skeptical purging of the senses (and even the
          evident cognitions of arithmetic and geometry), resulting in the discovery
          that only the thinking "I" itself cannot be doubted.  He then explores the
          nature of this "I", finding that it consists in thinking alone.  In the midst
          of this exploration, Descartes has the meditator reflect on the prospect of
          using the faculty of imagination--a faculty essential to all human
          intellectual cognition according to the Aristotelians--to know the soul.  Part
          way through the Second Meditation, while still contemplating the "I", the
          meditator has the following insight:
               It would indeed be a case of fictitious invention if I used my
               imagination to establish that I was something or other; for
               imagining is simply contemplating the shape or image of a corporeal
          _________________________
          21.  Ignatius of Loyola, _T_h_e _S_p_i_r_i_t_u_a_l _E_x_e_r_c_i_s_e_s, with the _D_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y _t_o _t_h_e
          _S_p_i_r_i_t_u_a_l _E_x_e_r_c_i_s_e_s of his followers, W. H. Longridge, trans., 4th ed.
          (London: Mowbray, 1950), First Week, First Exercise, pp. 52-57, and
          _D_i_r_e_c_t_o_r_y, ch. 14, secs. 2-3; Francis de Sales, _A_n _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o_n _t_o _a _D_e_v_o_u_t_e
          _L_i_f_e, I. Yakesley, trans. (Douai: Heighman, 1613), pt. 2, pp. 138-143.
          22.  On Descartes’s use of the meditative genre, see the first three essays
          in _E_s_s_a_y_s _o_n _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s’ _M_e_d_i_t_a_t_i_o_n_s, Amelie O. Rorty, ed. (Berkeley and Los
          Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), and Berel Lang, _A_n_a_t_o_m_y _o_f
          _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _S_t_y_l_e (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), ch. 3.
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               thing.  Yet now I know for certain both that I exist and at the same
               time that all such images and, in general, everything relating to
               the nature of body, could be mere dreams.  Once this point has been
               grasped, to say "I will use my imagination to get to know more
               distinctly what I am" would seem to be as silly as saying "I am now
               awake, and see some truth; but since my vision is not yet clear
               enough, I will deliberately fall asleep so that my dreams may
               provide a truer and clearer representation."  I thus realize that
               none of the things that the imagination enables me to grasp is at
               all relevant to this knowledge of myself which I possess, and that
               the mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such things
               if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible. (CSM
               II:19, AT VII:28)
          He then proceeds to list the activities of thought that belong to himself as a
          thing that thinks: doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, and
          seeming to imagine and to sense.  Notoriously, the meditator then notices that
          corporeal things still seem better known than "this puzzling ’I’ which cannot
          be pictured in the imagination." (CSM II:20, AT VII:29)  So he begins to
          contemplate wax as in instance of body, thereby discovering in himself a
          faculty distinct from the imagination and able to grasp the infinity of shapes
          that melted wax can take.  The meditator then reflects that this faculty is
          implicated in every act of cognition, even those that are described as simple
          acts of seeing.  In the Second Meditation he simply characterizes this faculty
          as "the mind alone," and its operation as a "purely mental scrutiny." (CSM
          II:21, AT VII:31)  At the beginning of the Sixth Meditation he again
          distinguishes the faculty that can grasp many geometrical figures from the
          faculty of imagination.  Here he puts a name to this faculty: it is
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          "intellectio pura," i. e., the "pure intellect" (or "pure understanding," in
          the words of Cottingham _e_t _a_l.). (CSM II:50-51, AT VII:72-73)  Pure intellect
          is, by Descartes’s lights, one of two faculties essential to mind (the other
          being will), and it is the faculty by which the essences of mind and matter
          are discerned, and by which God is known.23
               Descartes’s conception of the intellect, then, is absolutely central to
          his philosophy.  Just as in the Aristotelian framework, the question arises of
          how Descartes could account for the intellect’s ability to grasp the essences
          of things, and for him the question seems all the more pressing, since he
          alleged that the intellect can do so independently of sensory contact.  This
          question is a correlate to one later posed by Kant, who asked how the
          understanding could ever cognize objects, as regards their substance and
          causal connections, independently of the senses (which, by themselves, he
          considered inadequate for the task). (CPR A85-94/B118-127)  Platonist
          philosophers had maintained that the human intellect attains knowledge of the
          essences of things via cognitive access to eternal Forms, or to archetypes in
          the mind God, or else to copies of those archetypes implanted in human minds.
          They posited a "preformation-system of pure reason," in Kant’s words, among
          eternal Forms or essences, the things in the world that participate in them,
          and the objects of human intellection.24  Descartes, however, rejected this
          _________________________
          23.  In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes explains that the senses should not
          be used for making judgments "about the essential nature of the bodies
          located outside us"; rather, such judgments should be left to the
          "intellect," or the "mind alone," operating independently of the body (CSM
          II:57-58, AT VII:82-83).  In Meditations Three, Five, and Six he uses the
          intellect (ostensibly) to know God and the essences of matter and mind.
          24.  Kant, CPR B167 (Kant here makes no mention of Platonism, but see also
          A313-14/B370).  On Platonist theories of cognition in the early modern
          period, see my "Cognitive Faculties."  The harmony is not "preformed" if it
          is established via the causal agency of the Forms themselves, being "seen"
          by the human intellect; it is preformed on a "reminiscence" reading of
          Plato.
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          conception of the link between mind and world.  In connection with his
          doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths, he forsook the claim that the
          so-called "eternal truths" pertaining to created things reflect the basic
          structure of the divine understanding.  Rather, these truths are created, just
          as are the things.25  The access that the human mind has to these created
          essences is still explained by a "pre-established harmony," enacted by God’s
          will, between created substances and their essences as known by pure
          intellect.  Descartes retains a divine role in explaining the functioning of
          pure intellect, without needing to claim that the human intellect, and the
          knowledge of natural things gained by it, reflect the divine understanding.26
          In this doctrine the relations among essences, minds, and things become
          tightly bound, and hence the theory of intellectual cognition itself becomes a
          part of metaphysics.
               In comparison with the Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptions, Locke
          attributed to the human mind a weak intellectual candle.  Although showing
          signs of nostalgia for knowledge of real essences, Locke grudgingly admitted
          that such knowledge is beyond our ken.  He came to this conclusion in a work
          entitled _A_n _E_s_s_a_y _C_o_n_c_e_r_n_i_n_g _H_u_m_a_n _U_n_d_e_r_s_t_a_n_d_i_n_g, a title in which the word
          "understanding" is not a gerund referring to the activity of understanding,
          but a count noun referring to the faculty of understanding.27  Yet curiously,
          despite this fact, and unlike our Aristotelians and Descartes, Locke does not
          _________________________
          25.  Descartes, letters to Mersenne in the 1630s (CSMK, pp. 23-26, AT I:145,
          149-53); Fifth and Sixth Sets of Replies (CSM II:261, 291, 293-4; AT
          VII:380, 432, 435-6).
          26.  For further discussion, see Emile Br’ehier, "The Creation of the Eternal
          Truths in Descartes’s System," in _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s: _A _C_o_l_l_e_c_t_i_o_n _o_f _C_r_i_t_i_c_a_l
          _E_s_s_a_y_s, Willis Doney, ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
          1968), pp. 192-208; and my "Reason, Nature, and God."
          27.  John Locke, _A_n _E_s_s_a_y _C_o_n_c_e_r_n_i_n_g _H_u_m_a_n _U_n_d_e_r_s_t_a_n_d_i_n_g, Peter H. Nidditch,
          ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), epistle, p. 6.  Hereafter, the
          _E_s_s_a_y will be cited as "E," followed by book, chapter, and section numbers.
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          lay out in a systematic fashion his conception of this faculty and its
          relation to the other faculties.  He uses the word "understanding" in
          Descartes’s broad sense, to denote the "perceptive power" of the mind, as
          distinct from will. (E II.xxi.5-6)  He does no more than list a number of
          faculties exhibiting this power, including perception, contemplation, memory,
          discerning, comparing, composition, enlarging, and abstraction (but no
          separate faculty of pure understanding, in Descartes’s narrow sense). (E
          II.ix-xi)  This lack of a systematic theory of the metaphysics of the
          faculties and their powers is perhaps consonant with Locke’s belief that the
          power of the understanding itself is limited and so is not able to determine
          its own nature--any more than it can, more generally, determine the natures of
          mind or matter. (E II.xxiii)  Thus, Locke’s restriction of his inquiry to the
          "plain, Historical method," a method of observation based in experience, even
          though coming at the beginning of his _E_s_s_a_y, reflects an important conclusion
          of that work: that human knowledge can be based only on experience, not on
          purely intellectual cognition of the sort claimed by Descartes.  To that
          extent, his "empiricism" reflects a direct and substantive disagreement with
          both Descartes and the Aristotelians concerning the power of the human
          intellect.
               A principal aim of Locke’s _E_s_s_a_y was to discern the bounds of the
          understanding’s power, to learn the "Extent of its Tether." (E I.i.4)  Some of
          his most vigorously argued conclusions pertain to what the understanding can’t
          do, or doesn’t possess.  Thus, he argues, contra Descartes and others, that
          the understanding possesses no innate ideas and knows no principles innately.
          (E I.ii)  The content of thought must come from the senses or from reflection
          on the operation of the mind in connection with sensory materials: from either
          "external" or "internal" sensation. (E II.i.2-4)  Human cognition is limited
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          to sensory ideas, or images.28  But, contrary to the Aristotelians, Locke does
          not find that the understanding, in operating upon sensory images, has the
          power to extract the "common natures" or essences of things.  (Locke was in
          any case strongly dubious of the existence of Aristotelian "substantial
          forms," a notion that he found unintelligible--E III.vi.10.)  In the end, he
          decided that knowledge of real essences of substances is beyond us. (E
          III.vi.6, 9)  In his view, "abstraction" yields general ideas that can denote
          many particulars, but we achieve general ideas only of what he termed simple
          or mixed modes, or nominal essences--general ideas either of a single type of
          simple sensory idea such as a color, or such as are produced through a
          combination of such simple ideas (E III.iii-vi)--but not of the real essences
          of substances.29  Further, "intuitive" and "demonstrative" knowledge, to which
          Locke attributed the highest degree of certainty, extend no further than the
          relations among our own ideas. (E IV.iii.1-5)  Since we have no idea of the
          real essences of substances, we are unable to achieve intuitive knowledge of
          the relation between property and essence--the best we can do is to achieve
          intuitive certainty with respect to "visible connections" among some of the
          primary qualities of things, such as the connection according to which figure
          presupposes extension. (E IV.iii.14)
               Locke’s _E_s_s_a_y is an intricate web of argument and assertion, comprising
          other factors besides the theory of the faculties, including ordinary appeals
          to cognitive virtues such as clarity (appeals that can be assessed for
          themselves without the need to draw upon a theory of the faculties).  Still,
          _________________________
          28.  On Locke as an "imagist," that is, as someone who took the content of
          thought to limited to sensory images and their combination (together with
          refections on the mind’s own operations), see Michael Ayers, _L_o_c_k_e, _v_o_l. _I:
          _E_p_i_s_t_e_m_o_l_o_g_y (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pt. I, ch. 5.
          29.  For a comparison of Locke’s position to Aristotelian and Cartesian
          (among other) conceptions of substance and our cognitive grasp of it, see
          Ayers, _L_o_c_k_e, _v_o_l. _I_I: _O_n_t_o_l_o_g_y, pt. I, chs. 2, 6.
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          appeals to the powers and limits of human cognitive faculties play an
          important role, even in those parts of the work that are not specifically
          directed toward an analysis of cognition itself.  In particular, Locke
          repeatedly invokes limitations on "Our Faculties" in explaining the failure to
          know real essences. (E III.vi.9)  There are at least three aspects of this
          failure.  First, there is a failure to know the corpuscular constitution of
          things (on the assumption that the "real essences" of bodies are
          corpuscular),30 which may in part be due to remediable causes, such as lack of
          experiments, but in other cases is due to a lack of sensory acuity for
          perceiving the minute constitution of bodies, or (Locke speculates) perhaps
          even a lack of the appropriate kind of sense organ. (E IV.iii.23-25)  Second,
          even if we could perceive the "real essence," we are very limited in our
          cognitive ability to grasp any connection between that essence and the
          properties that flow from it (E III.vi.19), as regards both primary and
          secondary qualities. (E IV.iii.12, 29)  Third, "we may be convinced that the
          _I_d_e_a_s, we can attain to by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to Things
          themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self, which is
          the Foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us." (E IV.iii.23)
               Having limited the contents of cognition to simple sensory ideas and
          their combination, and having restricted the cognitive powers to those that
          perceive, store, compare, and combine such ideas, Locke found that the human
          mind is incapable of grasping real essences, either of minds or of bodies.  He
          did make one seemingly metaphysically ambitious claim, to demonstrate the
          existence of a supreme intelligence, creator of the world; but in this
          _________________________
          30.  The relations among the concept of substance, that of real essence, and
          the corpuscular theory of matter in Locke’s writing is a matter of some
          interpretive delicacy; for an overview, see Edwin McCann, "Locke’s
          Philosophy of Body," in _C_a_m_b_r_i_d_g_e _C_o_m_p_a_n_i_o_n _t_o _L_o_c_k_e, Vere Chappell, ed.
          (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 56-88, especially sec. 4.
                                              - 22 -
          demonstration all cognitive access to God comes via inference from created
          things, reasoning by analogy with the actions and attributes of human minds.
          (E IV.x)  Locke in effect held that the human intellect lacks the cognitive
          resources to succeed at the tasks of traditional metaphysics.  This being the
          case, he, by contrast with the Aristotelians and Descartes, had no need to
          explain how the understanding can grasp the essences of things.
               Long before Kant, then, the Lockean intellect has already forsaken any
          bid to know the "things in themselves" (substances as they are in themselves).
          Kant presented a fuller range of arguments for a more definitive version of
          this conclusion, and he constructed an account of knowledge in which our
          knowledge of nature meets the criterion of _s_c_i_e_n_t_i_a as an organized body of
          necessary and universal propositions.  Locke, by contrast, has the knower
          still trying to grasp the real essences of mind-independent objects, and
          simply coming up short.  Although Kant admired Locke’s analysis of the
          faculties of cognition, he felt that Locke had misunderstood the role of the
          faculties in metaphysical cognition, and had pursued the investigation
          incorrectly, by making it empirical. (CPR A86-87/B119)  Kant also limited the
          materials upon which the understanding can operate to the representations of
          sensibility, but he attributed a set of categories to the understanding that
          rendered such representations into cognition of a law-governed world of
          nature, ordered in space and time.  He gave up claims to know the intelligible
          world of things in themselves, in order to gain title to knowing an ideal but
          comprehensible world of nature.31
          _________________________
          31.  CPR, A256-57/B312-313; Kant, _P_r_o_l_e_g_o_m_e_n_a _t_o _A_n_y _F_u_t_u_r_e _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_s _T_h_a_t
          _W_i_l_l _B_e _A_b_l_e _t_o _C_o_m_e _F_o_r_w_a_r_d _a_s _S_c_i_e_n_c_e, Gary Hatfield, ed. and trans.
          (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), sec. 34.
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          2.  Mind and Psychology
               Philosophers of the early modern period, whether conceiving of themselves
          as metaphysicians or as inquirers into the grounds and limits of human
          knowledge, proffered theories of the cognitive faculties.  These were theories
          of the senses, imagination, and intellect, among others.  Viewed from the
          standpoint of the twentieth century--and especially that of our middle
          decades--this penchant for investigating the mind has seemed like an
          embarrassment to philosophy, like an early version of the fallacy of
          "psychologism."32  Consequently, many recent philosophers have deemed it best
          to ignore or minimize the allegedly outdated "faculty psychology" of the early
          moderns.
               This charge of psychologism provides an interesting lesson in the ironies
          of anachronism.  The indictment of "psychologism" relies on an assimilation of
          early modern theories of cognition to recent conceptions of mind, psychology,
          epistemology, and their relations.  It thereby misreads the substantive
          positions of the early modern authors, and then, on the grounds of this
          misreading, charges those same authors with errors they did not commit, while
          at the same time failing to detect their real mistakes, or at least our real
          _________________________
          32.  Richard Rorty, in his _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _a_n_d _t_h_e _M_i_r_r_o_r, reconstructs the
          history of modern philosophy as part a narrative within which, from the time
          of Locke through Kant to the present day, philosophy’s (alleged) claim to
          intellectual authority has rested on a confusion between epistemology and
          psychology, which he compares to the "naturalistic fallacy" in ethics (p.
          141); hence, though he did not use the term "psychologism," his charge fits
          the classical meaning of that term, according to which psychologism is the
          attempt to base epistemology on psychology.  J. E. Erdmann gave this meaning
          to the term in introducing it, _G_r_u_n_d_r_i_s_s _d_e_r _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e, 2d
          ed., 2 vols. (Berlin: Hertz, 1870), vol. II, p. 636; see also John Dewey,
          "Psychologism," in _D_i_c_t_i_o_n_a_r_y _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _a_n_d _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, James Mark
          Baldwin, ed., 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1901-05), vol. II, p. 382.
          Rorty reviews earlier instances of this charge against early modern
          philosophy by T. H. Green and Wilfrid Sellars, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _a_n_d _t_h_e _M_i_r_r_o_r,
          pp. 140-43.
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          differences with them.  Psychologism is a species of the naturalistic fallacy.
          The alleged "fallacy" lies in the move from fact to norm, from descriptions of
          how things are--for example, with patterns of human behavior, or with habits
          of human thought--to conclusions about how things ought to be.  Thus, even if
          most people lie, that doesn’t make lying morally correct.  Moral philosophy
          and epistemology respectively speak to how we ought to behave or what
          constitutes good warrant for belief, in spite of what empirical study may show
          about actual behavior or belief formation.
               The contention that the psychologistic inference from actual pattern of
          thought to norm for thought is a "fallacy" assumes a particular philosophical
          position.  It assumes that our innate patterns of thought do not in fact
          reflect and thereby manifest norms for good thinking.  By the late nineteenth
          century this assumption may have possessed good philosophical warrant.  Of
          interest here is the fact that the early modern authors discussed herein,
          including the Aristotelians, Descartes, and Locke, all rejected this
          assumption.  According to the Aristotelians, the natural human faculties by
          themselves tend toward true cognition.  Logic, in their view, was an
          artificial system for aiding and improving cognition.  It systematized the
          norms implicit in actual human reasoning, and provided aids for avoiding
          error.
33
  Similarly, Descartes considered the deliverances of pure intellect
          _________________________
          33.  Francisco Toledo, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_a, _u_n_a _c_u_m _q_u_a_e_s_t_i_o_n_i_b_u_s, _i_n _u_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_m
          _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _L_o_g_i_c_a_m (K"oln: Birckmann, 1596), pref., qu. 1 (pp. 3-7); Coimbra
          College, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_i _c_o_l_l_e_g_i_i _c_o_n_i_m_b_r_i_c_e_n_s_i_s _e _s_o_e_c_i_e_t_a_t_e _i_e_s_u, _i_n _u_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_m
          _D_i_a_l_e_c_t_i_c_a_m _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s (Lyon: Horation Cardon, 1607), proem, qu. 4, art. 2
          (pp. 57-61); Antoniao Rubio, _L_o_g_i_c_a _m_e_x_i_c_a_n_a, _s_i_v_e _c_o_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_i _i_n _u_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_m
          _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _L_o_g_i_c_a_m, 2 parts (K"oln: Birckmann, 1605), proem, qu. 1, pt. I
          (cols. 1-11); Eustace of St. Paul, _S_u_m_m_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e, pt. I, "Dialecticae
          sive logicae," proem, qu. 4 (pp. 10-11).  It was common to describe the
          operations of the "natural light" of the human intellect as instantiating
          "natural logic," by contrast with the "artificial logic" developed by
          Aristotle and others; Toledo declines to adopt this terminology, refusing to
          call these natural operations in themselves a "logic" (p. 5).
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          to directly present the truth.  He took the "impulses" of the will to affirm
          clear and distinct intellectual perceptions as the sure sign of the truth of
          those perceptions.  He held that the "natural" intellect--the intellect we
          have by nature--sets a norm for good thinking, because its proper use cannot
          fail but to achieve truth.34  Within such a framework, the move from mental
          fact to cognitive norm is warranted.  Locke, too, accepted the workings of the
          "discerning faculties" as constitutive of right thinking (E IV.i.2), though he
          made the weakest claims for the scope of the truth-discerning power of the
          human intellect.  Perhaps because the Aristotelians and Descartes each made
          such strong claims for the power of the intellect, they both attempted to
          explain why the deliverances of the intellect could be trusted: Aquinas
          appealed to the "participation" of the human intellect in the "uncreated
          light" of the divine intellect, and Descartes to God-installed innate ideas
          and faculties of judgment.
               Given that early modern authors investigated mental faculties in
          connection with method, metaphysics, and the theory of soul, shall we conclude
          that they were engaged in psychology?  Was their investigation naturalistic,
          and if not, what was it?  Supernaturalistic?  And if we reject Descartes’s
          claims for the intellect, is that because we think he was a bad psychologist,
          or is it because we have more substantive disagreements with him over the
          powers of human cognition, and the existence of substances constituted with
          intelligible essences?  These questions, like the charge of psychologism,
          invite us to reflect on the fit between (on the one hand) our conceptions of
          _________________________
          34.  Descartes, _M_e_d_i_t_a_t_i_o_n_s, IV: "since my understanding comes from God,
          everything that I understand I understand correctly, and any error here is
          impossible" (CSM II:40, AT VII:58); clear and distinct perceptions of the
          intellect produce a "great inclination in the will," and as long as one
          assents only to such clear and distinct intellectual perceptions, one will
          not fall into error (CSM II:41, AT VII:59).  See also _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_s, I.30-42.
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          the natural, the psychological, and the mental, and (on the other) the
          corresponding early modern conceptions.
               Let us begin with psychology.  The name derives from the account of the
          soul, "logon peri tes psyches," as pursued by Aristotle; in the middle ages
          this discipline was most known under the latinate label "de anima," but from
          the sixteenth century on it was sometimes latinized as "psychologia."35  The
          subject matter of "de anima" psychology, determined as it was by the
          Aristotelian conception of soul, included the nutritive, motive, sensory, and
          rational faculties of animate or ensouled beings.  Nonetheless, in the
          textbooks and _D_e _a_n_i_m_a commentaries of the early modern period, as in
          Aristotle’s own text, greater attention was given to the cognitive faculties,
          sensitive and rational, than to the others.  The material conditions of the
          operations of the senses were charted, cerebral anatomy was discussed, and
          some mention was made of the cognitive division of labor among the external
          and internal senses, the estimative power, and the active and patient
          intellects.36  Within the Aristotelian curriculum, the theory of the soul fell
          _________________________
          35.  The earliest free-standing work entitled "psychology" was by Rudolph
          Goclenius, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a: _h_o_c _e_s_t, _d_e _h_o_m_i_n_i_s _p_e_r_f_e_c_t_i_o_n_e, _a_n_i_m_o (Marburg:
          Paul Egenolph, 1594), which focused more on problems concerning the infusion
          of the soul into the embryo at conception than on the discussions of the
          cognitive faculties that characterized the _D_e _a_n_i_m_a literature; the latter
          sort of discussion occurred in Johann Conrad Dannhauer, _C_o_l_l_e_g_i_u_m
          _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_c_u_m, _i_n _q_u_o _m_a_x_i_m_e _c_o_n_t_r_o_v_e_r_s_a_e _q_u_a_e_s_t_i_o_n_e_s, _c_i_r_c_a _l_i_b_r_o_s _t_r_e_s
          _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, _p_r_o_p_o_n_u_n_t_u_r, _v_e_n_t_i_l_a_n_t_u_r, _e_x_p_l_i_c_a_n_t_u_r (Argentoranti:
          Josias Staedel, 1630).  On the origin of the terms "psychologia" and
          "psychology," Francois H. Lapointe, "Who Originated the Term ’Psychology’?,"
          _J_o_u_r_n_a_l _o_f _t_h_e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _t_h_e _B_e_h_a_v_i_o_r_a_l _S_c_i_e_n_c_e_s 8 (1972), pp. 328-35; on
          early psychology, Paul Mengal, "Naissances de la psychologie: la Nature et
          l’Esprit," _R_e_v_u_e _d_e _S_y_n_t_h‘_e_s_e, 115 (1994), pp. 355-373, and my "Psychology as
          a Natural Science in the Eighteenth Century," ibid., pp. 375-391.
          36.  Toledo, CDA, devoted fol. 65rb-73vb to the vegetative soul, 73vb-129ra
          to the sensitive, 129ra-169ra to the intellect, and 169rb-179rb to appetite,
          will, and motion; Coimbra College, CDA, devoted pp. 148-61 to the vegetative
          soul, 160-361 to the sensitive, 360-469 to the intellect, 460-98 to
          appetite, will, and motion, with separate treatises on the separated soul
          (pp. 499-596) and on additional problems pertaining to the five senses (pp.
          597-619); Rubio, CDA, devoted pp. 278-305 to the vegetative soul, 305-632 to
          the sensitive, 633-735 to the rational, and 735-57 to appetite, will, and
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          under the rubric of physics, or natural philosophy.  The soul was considered
          part of nature.37  Only in the discussion of the immaterial intellect was
          there a tendency to consider supranatural explanatory agencies, as in the
          doctrine of the unity of the active intellect.  The Aristotelians discussed
          above rejected this doctrine, affirming that the active intellect is a
          natural, if immaterial, power of the human soul, where the latter is regarded
          as the form of a corporeal substance, the human being.
               Already we can tell that our categories "natural," "physical," and
          "psychological" do not easily map the Aristotelian position, in which an
          immaterial power is considered to be part of nature, and indeed, to form a
          portion of the subject matter of physics, understood as the science of all
          natural things.  Perhaps even more seemingly odd, Antoine Le Grand, a dualist
          follower of Descartes, ranged the theory of mind or soul under the heading of
          physics.  And, looking further ahead, the eighteenth-century systematist
          Christian Wolff placed the soul, considered as an immaterial substance, within
          the natural world, and Kant put the discipline of psychology under the
          discipline of physics, or, in his terms, under "physiologia" (the _l_o_g_o_s of
          _p_h_y_s_i_s).38  If naturalism as applied to the mind is the doctrine that we
          _________________________
          motion, adding a treatise on the separated soul (758-94).  The coverage was
          slightly more balanced in the textbooks: e. g., Eustace of St. Paul, SP-P
          ("Physica"), devoted 197-228 to the vegetative soul, 228-77 to the
          sensitive, including motion, and 278-308 to the rational soul, including
          will.
          37.  Toledo, CDA, proem, qu. 2 (fol. 4), subsumed the soul in all of its
          operations under physics; Coimbra College, CDA, proem, qu. 1, art. 2 (pp.
          7-8) and Rubio, CDA, proem, qu. 1 (pp. 10-11), subsumed the study of
          embodied souls under physics, and separated souls under metaphysics.
          Eustace of St. Paul, SP-P, treated "de anima" topics in the part entitled
          "Physica," per the norm.
          38.  Antoine Le Grand, _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_i_o _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _s_e_c_u_n_d_u_m _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a _d_e _R_e_n_a_t_i
          _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s (London: J. Martyn, 1678), praecognoscenda, art. 7, 15, 16.
          Christian Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig:
          Libraria Rengeriana, 1640), sec. 69; _C_o_s_m_o_l_o_g_i_a _g_e_n_e_r_a_l_i_s (Frankfurt am Main
          and Leipzig: Libraria Rengeriana, 1637), sec. 509; Wolff’s follower
          Alexander Baumgarten, _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a, 7th ed. (Halle: Hemmerde, 1779), sec.
          351, 402, explicitly placed monads or simple substances, including spirits,
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          should explain mental activity by appeal only to natural agencies, then by
          their own lights these Aristotelians and substance dualists both count as
          naturalists.  Yet these same groups also regarded the "natural" mind as an
          instrument for discerning truth; hence, "naturalistic" description of that
          mind could at the same time serve as the basis for an analysis of the
          conditions for knowledge.
               Kant developed a sharp distinction between empirical psychology (part of
          _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_a) and the transcendental philosophical investigation of the knowing
          faculties.  By the middle decades of our own century, it was usual to relegate
          psychology to the "logical space of causes," by contrast with that of
          "reasons."  Scientific psychology, insofar as it concerned itself with the
          mental at all, came to be viewed as descriptive of the causal mechanisms of
          cognition, not of its norms.  Yet the "common wisdom" that septic boundaries
          must be observed between epistemology and psychology on pain of psychologistic
          fallacy is now being challenged by some attempts to "naturalize" epistemology.
          Is naturalized epistemology a return to the early modern project of charting
          the cognitive faculties?  The answer must be "yes and no."  Both base the
          investigation of the faculties on experience, though the early moderns gave
          greater weight to ordinary first-person reports of cognitive experience than
          do today’s experimentalists.  Both consider the actual operating
          characteristics of the mind to be relevant to determining the limits of human
          knowledge, as in a recent philosophical attempt to argue that with our
          cognitive resources it may be impossible for us to solve the mind-body
          problem.39  But there is divergence over the central question of defining
          _________________________
          within cosmology.  Kant, CPR A846-47/B874-75; in the _P_r_o_l_e_g_o_m_e_n_a, sec. 15,
          Kant places psychology under "universal natural science."
          39.  Colin McGinn, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" _M_i_n_d 98 (1989), pp.
          349-366.
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          epistemic norms.  As we have seen, early modern theorists held that well-
          functioning natural mental faculties exhibit norms for good thinking.  Recent
          naturalists are split on this question.  Some see our natural faculties as
          shaped by natural selection to track the truth, much as, in the earlier
          theories, God forged a harmony between the faculties and their objects.40  The
          operation of our faculties can thus be expected to exhibit epistemic norms
          (though these are, of course, open to refinement).  But others see a
          different, and more limited role for naturalistic explanation in epistemology.
          They take epistemic norms or standards as given by acknowledged cognitive
          achievements--say, those of the sciences--and endeavor to understand
          naturalistically the processes by which such achievements occur.41
               There is, then, an analogy between recent investigations of the role of
          cognitive faculties in human knowledge and the early modern investigations.
          Both look to the natural capacities of the mind for insight into human
          knowledge, which seems a reasonable strategy if it is not pursued with a
          predetermined conclusion (e. g., one of the reductionisms) decided beforehand.
          But the commonalities between now and then turn out to be quite limited, and
          these limitations can help us to see the need to consider again the framework
          within which we now discuss mind, cognition, and psychology.
               Our seventeenth century authors placed great weight on the investigation
          of the cognitive faculties because they believed that the human mind has a
          fixed cognitive structure, and that study of the noetic powers manifested
          within this structure reveals, in the case of metaphysical optimists such as
          the Aristotelians and Descartes, the possibility of the cognition of natural
          _________________________
          40.  W. V. O. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in his _O_n_t_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l _R_e_l_a_t_i_v_i_t_y _a_n_d
          _O_t_h_e_r _E_s_s_a_y_s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 114-138, on
          pp. 125-28.
          41.  Miriam Solomon, "Scientific Rationality and Human Reasoning,"
          _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _S_c_i_e_n_c_e  59 (1992), pp. 439-455, on pp. 442-43.
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          essences, or, in the case of pessimists such as Locke, the limits to our
          cognitive domain.  In either event, the early moderns held that the very
          mechanisms of belief fixation are given with the architecture of the mind.
               The plausible boundaries of a "fixed cognitive architecture" are not as
          extensive today.  Some cognitive capacities, especially sensory capacities,
          are relatively fixed: visual acuity, stereoscopic depth perception, perhaps
          even color similarity metrics.  But this is not so for belief fixation.  Even
          those who give great weight to evolution in shaping the mind must admit that a
          principal biological fact about human beings is that they possess general
          learning mechanisms capable of acquiring markedly distinct theoretical
          concepts and general conceptual schemes.  The range of this diversity must be
          at least as broad as the historically actual diversity of human thought.
          Thus, whereas Descartes could hope to discover the fundamental concepts of
          physics through proper reflection on innate ideas, scientists today have no
          such hope.  Belief fixation is highly sensitive to conceptual structure and
          background beliefs.  Conceptual structure and background beliefs depend on
          culturally transmitted learning.  A physicist today who is seeking to
          determine the basic categories of physics brings to bear his or her
          understanding of post-Newtonian physics.  Many of these concepts had not been
          envisioned during the time of Descartes.  But if belief formation is deeply
          culturally conditioned, then basic cognition is deeply culturally conditioned.
          As post-Kantian developments in geometry reveal, what can at one time seem so
          patently manifest that one is tempted to say that it is constitutive of our
          cognitive faculties and hence must permanently limit the range of scientific
          theories, can later be recognized as a contingent and falsifiable hypothesis
          that has become deeply entrenched in a cultural tradition.
               If belief fixation is a central feature of human mentality, and if it is,
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          to a significant extent, culturally constituted, then the human mind is a
          culturally constituted thing.  Should it therefore be seen as at least partly
          standing outside nature?  That depends on whether one posits a nature/culture
          demarcation.  If culture is held to be naturally conditioned but itself not
          part of "human nature" (except for the necessity of having a culture!), then
          the culturally constituted part of mind stands outside nature.  ("Natural" as
          applied to human beings is here narrowly construed to extend no further than
          to what is "biologically fixed.")  By contrast, if "the natural" is given
          broad boundaries so as to include all that might be contrasted with "the
          supernatural," then nature includes human culture, and the mind is wholly part
          of nature.  But if the mind as culturally constituted is part of nature, and
          if cognitive frameworks vary significantly across cultures, then naturalism
          cannot promise to achieve the same kind of generality that the seventeenth
          century wanted from its own "naturalism": insight into the permanent structure
          of cognition.  Thus, under either the broad or narrow conception of nature,
          naturalism ultimately undermines any hope for the kind of finality with
          respect to human cognitive structure that had been the goal for Descartes and
          Locke.  Historical reflection might then suggest that we rethink the rhetoric
          of epistemology and cognitive theory, and move beyond the early modern project
          of seeking to dissect the faculties of higher cognition once and for all.
               Reflection on the differences between our conception of psychology and
          Descartes’s understanding of his project reveals that our major differences
          with him do not pertain to the relevance of psychology to epistemology and
          metaphysics.  Rather, we disagree with his metaphysics of intellect: we reject
          his attribution to the mind of "noetic powers" for grasping essences by pure
          intellect.  The Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptions of intellect were laid
          to rest through the work of Locke, Hume, Kant, and others.  As the _a _p_r_i_o_r_i
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          powers granted to the intellect were proscribed, the sharp distinction between
          empirical psychology as a descriptive discipline and epistemology as a
          normative discipline came into being, and with it first arose the framework
          for leveling the charge of "psychologism."  As a consequence of these
          developments, it can now seem that talk of cognitive faculties could not be
          anything but a misapplication of our kind of empirical psychology; by
          contrast, in Descartes’s time "psychology" or the study of mind might well
          have included investigation of the noetic powers.  Philosophical progress is
          often reflected in changes in the problem space, and those very same changes
          may in fact serve to mask the developments that brought them about.
          3.  Historiography, Philosophy, and Interpretation
               The investigation of the cognitive faculties, their powers and limits,
          was a central focus of early modern theoretical philosophy.  Not only
          Descartes and Locke, who are discussed here, but Hobbes, Berkeley, and Kant
          made the faculties central to their discussions of the possibility for and
          limits to human knowledge.  In all of these discussions, the fortunes of
          metaphysics are directly linked to an investigation of the mind’s powers.
          Descartes sought to open up a new metaphysics, whereas Locke and Kant were
          coming to grips with the failure to know the real essences of mind-independent
          substances.  In either event, discussions of the mind’s real capacities
          contributed to metaphysical work.
               In highlighting the theme of the cognitive faculties I have sought to
          draw attention to an important but relatively neglected factor in the history
          early modern philosophy.  This theme is intended to complement, not to
          replace, other themes.  Indeed, with respect to the two themes mentioned at
          the beginning of this essay, attending to the role of the cognitive faculties
          can deepen our understanding of the ways in which early modern philosophy was
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          part of an "Age of Reason," or rose to meet a skeptical challenge: reason was
          conceived as a faculty of mind (or as an activity of the faculty of
          intellect), and skeptical writings typically were organized as challenges to
          the faculties of sense and intellect.  Reflection on the latter fact may help
          interpreters to see more clearly the uses to which skeptical arguments were
          put by Descartes and others.  More broadly, attention to controversies about
          the cognitive faculties can sharpen our understanding of a core substantive
          disagreement between "rationalist" and "empiricist": a disagreement about the
          power of the intellect to know the essences of things.
               If the cognitive faculties were so important, why have they been
          neglected in recent discussions?  Curiously, much of what early modern writers
          took to be central to their work has been excised from it out of a "principle
          of charity."  In the middle decades of this century, philosophical
          interpreters of past texts adopted the strategy of looking for what was "still
          of philosophical interest" in them, which meant what might still stand as a
          candidate solution to a philosophical problem of current interest.  These same
          interpreters were well-steeped in the notion of the "psychologistic fallacy."
          Further, they were far removed from the notion that the mind might possess
          special powers or capacities for perceiving essences.  Hence, when they read
          the work of a Descartes or Locke or Kant, the immediate response was either to
          ignore talk of faculties and cognitive powers, or to translate it into
          something that seemed more respectable.  A striking instance of this may be
          found in Strawson’s _B_o_u_n_d_s _o_f _S_e_n_s_e, in which he sought to untangle "what
          remains fruitful and interesting" from "what no longer appears acceptable, or
          even promising," in Kant’s work.  He thus replaced the "imaginary subject of
          transcendental psychology"--including its reference to a "manifold of
          intuition" and its appeal to an activity of "synthesis" to explain the unity
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          of consciousness--with philosophical analysis of "ordinary reports of what we
          see, feel, hear, etc." and of the "rules embodied in concepts of objects" as
          exemplified in "the general coherence and _c_o_n_s_i_s_t_e_n_c_y of our ordinary
          descriptions of what we see, hear, feel, etc."42  Here, talk in the
          "psychological idiom" is translated into the mid-twentieth century idiom of
          "philosophical analysis" in order to preserve what is "fruitful and
          interesting" in Kant.  The spirit of this interpretive tack received an
          extreme expression in Donald Davidson’s work on radical interpretation (though
          he cannot be held responsible for excesses in practice), in which Davidson
          concluded that our most effective strategy for making sense of others’
          utterances is that of interpreting them so that agreement is optimized.43  In
          any event, under the principle of "charity," when Descartes and the others
          were talking about cognitive faculties, they either were talking isolated
          nonsense or were engaged in (allegedly bad) empirical psychology; either way,
          those parts of the text can be treated as philosophically irrelevant in
          themselves.
               In contrast with the method of sifting through the detritus of past
          philosophy for salvage, in this paper I have adopted the strategy of starting
          from and working with the categories used by past authors, in order to achieve
          an understanding of their philosophical projects and of the (alleged) force of
          their philosophical arguments and conclusions as they saw it.  This means
          taking their claims at face value and seeking to understand whence they
          expected the force of the claims to come.  In pursuing this strategy, one is
          of course "charitable" in that one avoids easy attributions of silly mistakes
          _________________________
          42.  Strawson, _T_h_e _B_o_u_n_d_s _o_f _S_e_n_s_e: _A_n _E_s_s_a_y _o_n _K_a_n_t’_s _C_r_i_t_i_q_u_e _o_f _P_u_r_e
          _R_e_a_s_o_n (London: Methuen, 1966), pp. 16, 32.
          43. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," _P_r_o_c_e_e_d_i_n_g_s
          _a_n_d _A_d_d_r_e_s_s_e_s _o_f _t_h_e _A_m_e_r_i_c_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _A_s_s_o_c_i_a_t_i_o_n 47 (1974), pp. 5-20,
          on p. 19.
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          or blunders to past authors--though such attributions are not ruled out.  In
          Descartes’s case, beginning with his claims and conceptions means taking
          seriously his injunctions to "meditate with" him, and his assertion that he
          could intellectually perceive the extension of the geometers, or the idea of
          an infinitely perfect being.  In tenth-grade geometry I was told to imagine
          planes without thickness and lines without width.  I thought I was doing it,
          but now I believe not.  I certainly am unable to find in myself the pure
          intellectual cognition of a triangle of determinate shape, untinged by sensory
          qualities.  Further, though I know what it is to be intuitively certain of
          something, I don’t believe that such certainties can of themselves reveal the
          contours of mind-independent reality, the essences of substances.  I thus
          reject both Descartes’s conception of the intellect’s power and some of his
          assertions about its consciously accessible deliverances.  The fact that I
          think Descartes was wrong does not seem a good reason to allege that he was
          really saying something else.
               In order to learn from--or even to learn about--the history of
          philosophy, we must come to understand the historical development of
          philosophy in its own terms.  For the early modern period, this means
          acknowledging the centrality of the theory of the cognitive faculties in the
          philosophical work of the time.  Rather than ignoring talk of the faculties in
          classical texts, we should come to understand the role the faculties played.
          If the role is one that we now reject, then we should seek the philosophical
          reasons that led us to reject it.  In the course of doing this, we may learn
          the answers to (or at least learn to ask) questions such as the following: How
          have the relations among logic, mind, and psychology changed in the past three
          hundred years?  How did philosophers come to adopt the notion of a
          "psychologistic fallacy"?  What is the origin of our current notions of the
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          relations between the natural and the mental?  What can we say now about our
          ability to discern the truth?  Is it a simple biological capacity, or, at
          least for truths as complex as those of the natural sciences, does this
          ability depend on cultural processes that are underdetermined biologically?
               If we interpret past authors so as to have them (as much as possible) say
          only things that we might consider saying now, we shall surely do little more
          than find our own reflection in their texts.  We certainly won’t gain the sort
          of understanding that comes from uncovering the formation of our current
          problem space and seeing its contingencies.  Questions about the deep
          conceptual changes will go unasked, because the changes will be masked against
          the foreground of "charitable" renderings.  But contextually guided study of
          early modern philosophy can help bring such questions to light.  I am
          therefore suggesting that the philosophical works of the early modern period
          are of interest in their own right (_s_a_n_s a strong principle of charity) for
          what they can reveal to us about the structure of philosophy itself.
               The "principle of charity" turns out to be a stultifying principle of
          interpretation for the history of philosophy.  I propose that we reject it, or
          at the least supplement it with the practice of reading texts in the
          intellectual context of their time, using that context to make interpretive
          sense of conceptions that are _p_r_i_m_a _f_a_c_i_e foreign to us now.  In this way, we
          may truly come to learn about other philosophies, which is a necessary
          condition for learning from them.  At the same time, we will come to see that
          there is much to be learned about the implicit and explicit conceptions of
          mind, cognition, and logic in the philosophical texts of the early modern
          period, and about the heritage of those conceptions in the philosophical
          common sense of today.
